The development of regret by O'Connor, Eimear et al.
The development of regret
O'Connor, E., McCormack, T., & Feeney, A. (2012). The development of regret. Journal of Experimental Child
Psychology, 111(1), 120-127.
Published in:
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
Brief report
The development of regret
Eimear O’Connor ⇑, Teresa McCormack, Aidan Feeney
School of Psychology, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 23 March 2011
Revised 5 July 2011
Available online 17 August 2011
Keywords:
Regret
Counterfactual reasoning
Emotion
Decision making
Relief
Reasoning
a b s t r a c t
In two experiments, 4- to 9-year-olds played a game in which they
selected one of two boxes to win a prize. On regret trials the uncho-
sen box contained a better prize than the prize children actually
won, and on baseline trials the other box contained a prize of the
same value. Children rated their feelings about their prize before
and after seeing what they could have won if they had chosen
the other box and were asked to provide an explanation if their
feelings had changed. Patterns of responding suggested that regret
was experienced by 6 or 7 years of age; children of this age could
also explain why they felt worse in regret trials by referring to
the counterfactual situation in which the prize was better. No evi-
dence of regret was found in 4- and 5-year-olds. Additional ﬁnd-
ings suggested that by 6 or 7 years, children’s emotions were
determined by a consideration of two different counterfactual
scenarios.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
It is widely assumed that regret serves an adaptive function; put simply, the idea is that the expe-
rience of regret and rumination on alternative decisions leads to us making better decisions in the fu-
ture (Connolly & Hardman, 2009; Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg, 1999). Moreover, it is also argued that in
decision making, we attempt to minimize future regret (Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Experiencing regret
depends on an established capacity to think counterfactually because it involves comparing the actual
outcome with an alternative or counterfactual outcome. Although there is considerable debate over
the age at which counterfactual thinking ﬁrst develops (e.g., Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly,
2006; Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010), its emergence is usually located around 3 or 4 years
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at the earliest. Thus, it is generally agreed that counterfactual emotions such as regret cannot be pres-
ent until substantially later than basic emotions such as sadness.
Recent studies have assessed when children ﬁrst seem to understand that others may experience
regret (Beck & Crilly, 2009; Ferrell, Guttentag, & Gredlein, 2009; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008), typically
locating this point at around 7 years of age. However, what is likely to matter for decision making is
not whether one understands the conditions under which others experience regret but rather whether
one actually has such experiences oneself. Some preliminary evidence on the developmental emer-
gence of regret comes from a study by Amsel and Smalley (2000), who used a card game that was
manipulated to give rise to positive and negative outcomes. Children chose one of two face-down
cards and won stickers if their card had a higher value than that of the experimenter. They rated their
feelings about their card choice before seeing the unchosen card and after viewing the unchosen card.
Preschoolers did not rate themselves as less happy about their card choice if the alternative card
would have yielded a win than if it would have yielded a loss. Thus, Amsel and Smalley concluded that
children of preschool age did not compare the counterfactual outcome with the actual outcome and,
thus, did not experience regret.
Weisberg and Beck’s (2010a) study was the ﬁrst to systematically examine the age at which chil-
dren begin to experience counterfactual emotions. In their task, children chose between two boxes on
each trial; on regret trials the counterfactual prize (the prize in the unchosen box) was better than the
prize in the box that children had actually chosen, and on relief trials the counterfactual prize was
worse than the actual prize. Children were asked to rate their feelings about their actual prize before
and after the counterfactual prize was revealed. Weisberg and Beck found that by 5 years of age on
regret trials, children were signiﬁcantly less happy after the counterfactual prize was revealed than
before it was revealed. These authors argued that children experience regret from around 5 years
onward.
Given the functional role in adaptive decision making that theorists have assigned to it, it is impor-
tant to establish when children ﬁrst show evidence of regret. The current study follows up that of
Weisberg and Beck (2010a), focusing on regret. A key methodological difference between this study
and that of Weisberg and Beck is that we included a baseline trial in which the counterfactual prize
was identical to the actual prize. In Weisberg and Beck’s study, children were asked about their feel-
ings regarding their actual prize twice. If children believed that they needed to change their answer
when the question was repeated, then we might expect to see them changing their answer and, thus,
giving lower happiness ratings regardless of the nature of the counterfactual prize. Consistent with
this possibility, Weisberg and Beck found that 5-year-olds’ happiness ratings in regret trials after
the counterfactual prize was revealed did not differ signiﬁcantly from their happiness ratings after
the counterfactual prize was revealed on relief trials in which this prize was worse than the actual
prize. In our study, we included a baseline trial in which both the actual and counterfactual prizes
were identical to control for any effect of question repetition. If children genuinely experience regret
on regret trials, then their happiness ratings should be lower when they see the counterfactual prize
on regret trials than on baseline trials. In addition, we asked those children who changed their happi-
ness ratings when the counterfactual prize was revealed to explain why they did so in order to exam-
ine whether a consideration of the counterfactual alternative underpinned this change.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
The participants were 20 4- and 5-year-olds (10 girls and 10 boys, mean age = 5 years 1 month,
range = 58–68 months), 16 6- and 7-year-olds (7 girls and 9 boys, mean age = 7 years 4 months,
range = 81–92 months), and 24 8- and 9-year-olds (13 girls and 11 boys, mean age = 9 years
2 months, range = 105–116 months). Children were tested individually in a quiet area of their
school. All participants were recruited from the same school in Northern Ireland. The vast majority
were Caucasian and from working- and middle-class backgrounds.
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Apparatus
Four boxes were used, each of a different color with a distinctive image on each lid. For the regret
trial, there was a black box and an orange box with different cartoon characters on the lids. For the
baseline trial, there was a green box and a white box with different object photographs on the lids
(a tree and a postbox). For the regret trial, inside each of the colored boxes were hidden two smaller
silver boxes, with one of the silver boxes containing 1 token and the other containing 5 tokens. The
silver boxes were designed so that the experimenter could distinguish between them by touch. In
the baseline trial, there was one silver box inside each colored box, with each of the silver boxes con-
taining 1 token. The tokens were small green plastic disks.
A horizontal 5-point scale was used to measure ratings of happiness during the study, with pictures
of ﬁve cartoon faces varying in emotional expression starting with very happy on the left-hand side of
the scale and ending with very sad on the right-hand side. Children were asked to place an arrow poin-
ter at the face that best described their feelings during the game. A Dictaphone was used to record
children’s verbal responses.
Procedure
Children were invited to play a game in which they could win some stickers. Children were shown
a sample token, and it was explained to them that they could swap each token they won for a sticker of
their choice at the end of the game. They were introduced to the 5-point scale, and the points on the
scale were described to them as follows: feeling very happy, feeling a little bit happy, not feeling happy
and not feeling sad, feeling a little bit sad, and feeling very sad. Children received one regret trial and
one baseline trial, with the order of presentation of the trials counterbalanced, and they were not told
in advance how many trials they would receive or how many tokens the boxes might contain. After
both trials were completed, children swapped their tokens for stickers of their choice.
In the regret trial, the black and orange boxes were placed on a table, and children were told that
there were prizes of tokens inside each box and were asked to choose one box that would be opened to
reveal their prize. When they had made their choice, the experimenter opened the chosen box and
deliberately retrieved the smaller silver box that contained 1 token. Children were asked to show
how they felt about their prize by placing the pointer at the relevant face on the 5-point scale. The
experimenter said, ‘‘Let’s see how many tokens are in the box you did not choose,’’ and then opened
the other box, purposely retrieving the silver box containing 5 tokens (children were unaware that
there were two silver boxes inside each larger box). Children were then shown the more attractive
counterfactual prize and the experimenter said, ‘‘Here’s what you said about how you felt about your
prize of 1 token. How do you feel now? Do you want to leave the pointer where it is, or do you want to
move it?’’ If children moved the pointer, they were asked to explain why they now felt differently. The
experimenter removed the boxes and children retained their token. The procedure for the baseline
trial was identical to that for the regret trial except that each box contained only one smaller silver
box and the actual prize and counterfactual prize in the nonchosen box were the same (1 token).
Results and discussion
Children’s ratings of happiness before and after the counterfactual prize was revealed were code-
d in relation to the 5-point scale from 1 = very sad to 5 = very happy. Fig. 1 shows the mean happiness
ratings for each age group before and after the counterfactual prize was revealed for each trial type. An
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on happiness ratings with between-participants factors
of age group and trial order (regret trial ﬁrst or baseline trial ﬁrst) and within-participants factors of
time of rating (before the counterfactual prize was revealed or after the counterfactual prize was re-
vealed) and trial type (regret or baseline). A signiﬁcant three-way interaction among trial type, time of
rating, and age was found, F(2, 54) = 12.09, p < .001, g2p = .309. Further analyses revealed that the
interaction between time of rating and trial type was not signiﬁcant in the 4- and 5-year age group,
F < 1. However, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between trial type and time of rating in the
6- and 7-year-olds, F(1, 15) = 5.26, p < .05, g2p = .260, and in the 8- and 9-year-olds, F(1, 23) = 54.66,
p < .001, g2p = .704. Findings from Bonferroni-corrected paired samples t tests indicate that there was
a signiﬁcant difference in happiness rating before and after the counterfactual prize was revealed in
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the regret trial in the 6- and 7-year-olds, t(15) = 3.04, p = .008, g2 = .270, and in the 8- and 9-year-olds,
t(23) = 8.67, p < .001, g2 = .765, with both of these older age groups being signiﬁcantly less happy with
the actual prize after the counterfactual prize was revealed in the regret trial than before. There were
no such differences in the baseline trial. Differences in ratings of happiness after the counterfactual
prize was revealed were also compared across trial types. The 8- and 9-year-olds were signiﬁcantly
less happy after the counterfactual prize was revealed in the regret trial compared with the baseline
trial, t(23) = –6.91, p < .001, g2 = .675; this difference was not found to be signiﬁcant in the younger
age groups.
The effect of trial order was found to signiﬁcantly interact with time of rating, F(1, 54) = 4.86,
p = .032, g2p = .082, and with trial type, F(1, 54) = 34.01, p < .001, g2p = .386. Additional analyses revealed
that children who received the baseline trial ﬁrst reported signiﬁcantly lower ratings of happiness
after the counterfactual prize was revealed in the regret trial than children who received the regret
trial ﬁrst, t(58) = 2.15, p = .035, g2 = .271. However, the order of trial type did not affect happiness rat-
ings after the counterfactual prize had been revealed on the baseline trials, t(58) = –1.65, p > .05.
Children’s explanations of their change in feelings were classiﬁed in terms of whether they referred
to the alternative prize or not (e.g., ‘‘because the other box had more tokens’’). In addition, as a more
stringent test, we also examined whether children actually used counterfactual language. In the 6- and
7-year (n = 8) and 8- and 9-year (n = 22) age groups, 100% and 95.5% of children, respectively, ex-
plained their change of feeling about the actual prize on regret trials by referring to the counterfactual
prize, with 37.5% of 6- and 7-year-olds and 32% of 8- and 9-year-olds who felt worse using counter-
factual language. No child in these groups referred to wanting the counterfactual prize in baseline tri-
als. In the 4- and 5-year (n = 9) age group, only 22.2% of children referred to the counterfactual prize
when explaining their change of feelings in regret trials, with none of these children using counterfac-
tual language.
In summary, we found evidence of regret in our two oldest age groups but not in our 4- and 5-year-
old group. Moreover, the two older age groups were able to explain their change in feelings by point-
ing out the greater desirability of the counterfactual prize, and some of them used counterfactual lan-
guage in doing so. We interpret these ﬁndings as evidence for regret rather than an emotion such as
disappointment because the procedure was one in which children themselves made a choice leading
to the outcome, and children were also made aware of the counterfactual outcome after they had
made their choice. It is argued that these task features are more likely to yield regret than disappoint-
ment on the basis of both behavioral and neuropsychological evidence (e.g., Chua, Gonzalez, Taylor,
Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009; Zeelenberg, van Djik, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 1998). An unexpected ﬁnd-
ing in the study was the effect of order; regret was more marked when children received the baseline
trial ﬁrst. An obvious explanation of this ﬁnding is that these children were anticipating the counter-
factual prize on regret trials to be the same as the actual prize because this is what they had observed
on the ﬁrst (baseline) trial. When they saw that they could have in fact won 5 tokens on the regret
trial, they may have been particularly likely to regret their choice.
Fig. 1. Happiness ratings in Experiment 1 as a function of age group, trial type, and time of rating.
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Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we made two changes in methodology that we thought might increase the like-
lihood of observing regret in the younger children. First, all children received the baseline trial ﬁrst
because the order effect in Experiment 1 indicated that this would maximize the possibility that regret
would be reported. Second, we changed the method by which children reported their change in feel-
ings. In Experiment 1, we found that children were very likely to use ratings at the end of the scale
(either 1 or 5), with such responding accounting for 84% of all the responses given by the younger chil-
dren. Thus, we followed Weisberg and Beck (2010b) by introducing a mode of responding whereby
children could indicate their change in feelings in a categorical way after viewing the counterfactual
prize.
Method
Participants
The participants were 18 4- and 5-year-olds (10 girls and 8 boys, mean age = 5 years 5 months,
range = 59–71 months), 29 6- and 7-year-olds (12 girls and 17 boys, mean age = 7 years 5 months,
range = 84–94 months), and 31 8- and 9-year-olds (18 girls and 13 boys, mean age = 9 years
4 months, range = 108–119 months). The backgrounds of children were very similar to those in
Experiment 1.
Apparatus
The apparatus used in Experiment 2 was identical to that used in Experiment 1 except that the ori-
ginal single arrow pointer was amended to include three arrows that allowed children to indicate sim-
ply whether they felt the same, sadder, or happier.
Procedure
All children received the baseline trial ﬁrst. The rest of the procedure was the same as in Experi-
ment 1 except for the training phase, during which the function of the altered pointer was made clear.
This training session included the use of two puppets. The ﬁrst puppet, ‘‘Molly,’’ was given a toy cam-
era and was described as feeling a little bit happy, with the upward arrow pointer placed under the cor-
responding face on the 5-point scale. The puppet was then given a toy mobile phone and participants
were asked, ‘‘How do you think Molly will feel now that she has a camera and a mobile phone? Do you
think she will feel happier, sadder, or the same?’’ The experimenter pointed to the left-pointing arrow,
right-pointing arrow, and upward pointing arrow, respectively, while she asked the latter question
and in subsequent similar questions during training. The second puppet, ‘‘Peg,’’ was then introduced,
and this puppet was given two toy cameras and was described as feeling very happy, with the upward
arrow on the pointer placed at the appropriate far-left point at the end of the scale. This puppet was
then given a toy mobile phone and again participants were asked, ‘‘How do you think Peg will feel now
that she has two cameras and a mobile phone? Do you think she will feel happier, sadder, or the
same?’’ Children gave their answer by choosing one of the three prongs on the arrow.
This training was then repeated, but this time involving the characters having toys removed from
them so that they felt sadder. In each case, children were again asked, ‘‘Do you think she will feel hap-
pier, sadder, or the same?’’ The aim of this training was to ensure that children understood the scale
and that the pointer allowed them to indicate that a character could feel happier or sadder even if she
already felt very happy or very sad (i.e., even if ratings were already at the end of the scale). To ensure
that each participant could use the altered pointer before the study began, those children who did not
give the right answer to a question were corrected and the training was repeated. During the exper-
iment itself, children initially rated their feelings when the ﬁrst prize was revealed using the scale, as
in Experiment 1, and the upward arrow of the pointer (with the left- and right-pointing arrows
attached) was placed on the scale where they indicated. Next, when the counterfactual prize was
revealed, they indicated whether their feelings had changed by selecting the left- or right-pointing
arrow or had stayed the same by selecting the upward-pointing arrow.
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Results and discussion
The use of the new pointer yielded categorical data, with Table 1 showing the percentage of
children in each group who reported feeling the same, happier, or sadder when the counterfactual
prize was revealed. In the regret trials, there was a signiﬁcant age difference in the nature of
responses, v2(4) = 23.01, p < .001. The 6- and 7-year-olds, v2(2) = 8.63, p = .008, and the 8- and
9-year-olds, v2(2) = 22.64, p < .001, were signiﬁcantly more likely to report being sadder than the
4- and 5-year-olds after the counterfactual prize was revealed in this trial. Both of the older age
groups were more likely to report feeling sadder than before in regret trials than would be
predicted by chance, binomial test p < .01, assuming that by chance responses would be equally
distributed between the categories. Furthermore, responses differed signiﬁcantly between regret
and baseline trials for the 6- and 7-year-olds, v2(2) = 24.30, p < .001, and for the 7- and 8-year-
olds, v2(2) = 41.01, p < .001. Thus, as in Experiment 1, there was evidence for regret in the older
age groups.
Unexpectedly, children’s responses also differed between age groups on baseline trials, v2(4) =
9.78, p = .049. Although the majority of 6- and 7-year-olds reported feeling the same after the coun-
terfactual prize was revealed, this age group was signiﬁcantly more likely to report feeling happier
than the 4- and 5-year-olds, v2(2) = 7.28, p = .027, and the 8- and 9-year-olds also reported feeling
happier marginally signiﬁcantly more often than the 4- and 5-year-olds, v2(2) = 5.92, p = .051. Re-
sponses in the older age groups that indicated a change in feelings were signiﬁcantly more likely to
fall into the ‘‘happier than before’’ category than would be predicted by chance, binomial p < .01,
assuming that such responses would fall equally into the ‘‘happier than before’’ and ‘‘sadder than be-
fore’’ categories by chance. These ﬁndings suggest that at least some of the older children felt relief on
seeing that the counterfactual prize was the same as the actual prize in the baseline trial.
Explanations of changes in feelings were examined as in Experiment 1. In the regret trial, of the
6- and 7-year-olds (n = 20) who had changed their feelings, 85% referred to the counterfactual prize
in explaining this change (30% using counterfactual language), as did 89.3% of the 8- and 9-year-olds
(n = 28) (28.6% using counterfactual language). Of the 4- and 5-year-olds (n = 5) who reported a
change in feelings in the regret trial, 20% made reference to the fact that there had been a better prize,
and the remaining 4- and 5-year-olds gave a variety of unrelated explanations such as ‘‘because I like
Mickey Mouse.’’
General discussion
Across our two experiments, we ﬁrst observed evidence of regret at 6 years of age; moreover, by
this age, children consistently and coherently explained why they felt this way by making reference
to a more desirable counterfactual outcome. Because we compared patterns of responses on regret
trials with those on baseline trials, in which the counterfactual and actual outcomes were the same,
we can be conﬁdent that reported changes in feelings on the regret trials were not due to question
repetition. The 4- and 5-year-olds showed no evidence of regret in either experiment even when
the response mode was changed in Experiment 2 to overcome any difﬁculties they may have had in
using the scale to report a change in feelings, and trial order was set so as to magnify regret effects.
Thus, the age at which we ﬁrst report regret is slightly older than that reported by Weisberg and Beck
Table 1
Children’s reported change in happiness ratings as a function of age group and trial type in Experiment 2.
Happier than before (%) Sadder than before (%) No change (%)
4–5 years (n = 18) Regret 11 17 72
Baseline 11 17 72
6–7 years (n = 29) Regret 10 59 31
Baseline 34.5 0 65.5
8–9 years (n = 31) Regret 7 83 10
Baseline 39 3 58
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(2010a) (6- and 7-year-olds vs. 5- and 6-year-olds in their study), although the average age of our
youngest group of children was slightly lower than the average age of the youngest group that they
tested. Although we did not assess children’s understanding of regret in others, comparison of our
ﬁndings with those of previous studies that examined such understanding suggests that it may devel-
op shortly after regret is directly experienced, that is, around 7 years of age (Beck & Crilly, 2009; Ferrell
et al., 2009).
We have argued that experiencing regret requires the ability to compare a counterfactual alterna-
tive with the actual outcome, and indeed children’s explanations of their feelings bear this out. How-
ever, aspects of our data suggest that at least by 6 years of age, children’s feelings are determined not
only by a comparison between the counterfactual and actual outcomes but also by expectations that
they might possess about possible outcomes. In Experiment 1, regret on ﬁnding out that a counterfac-
tual prize was more valuable than the chosen prize was more marked when preceded by a trial in
which both counterfactual and actual prizes were identical. This suggests that viewing the baseline
trial led children to erroneously expect that the counterfactual prize on the regret trial would again
be the same as the actual prize, and thus they were particularly likely to report feeling sadder when
they saw that this was not the case. Therefore, we would speculate that children’s feelings were deter-
mined by a mental representation of two different counterfactual possibilities: the real unchosen
alternative (the better prize) and the counterfactual alternative that they erroneously anticipated
based on their experience in the baseline trial (a circumstance in which the alternative prize was
not better).
Some further evidence for the suggestion that children’s feelings stem from a consideration of not
just one but two different counterfactual possibilities comes from the baseline trial of the second
experiment in which a notable minority of the older children reported feeling happier on viewing
the counterfactual prize even though it was of equal value to the actual prize. We would argue that
these children felt relief on viewing the counterfactual prize because they realized that they could
not have made a choice leading to a better outcome. If this is correct, then it suggests that at least
a minority of children may be capable of experiencing relief at around the same time as they experi-
ence regret, that is, at around 6 or 7 years of age (cf. Weisberg & Beck, 2010a). Moreover, it would
again suggest that children’s emotional responses were determined by representing three outcomes:
the actual outcome and two different counterfactual possibilities. In this case, the two counterfactual
possibilities were the real unchosen alternative (which was the same as the chosen prize) and an alter-
native outcome in which the unchosen prize was better than the actual prize. Because this second
alternative was shown not to be possible, some children experienced relief. This interpretation of
our ﬁndings (i.e., that even 6-year-olds can consider multiple counterfactual possibilities) may have
implications for the literature on adult counterfactual thinking where there are different views on
the number of counterfactual alternatives that adults bear in mind when assessing outcomes (see
Feeney & Handley, 2006).
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